2026财年下半年，东方甄选的净溢利预计达到了2.81-3.11亿元，相较2025财年下半年，同比增长了172.8%至201.9%。

反转！皇马想买世界杯金球巨星：79岁佛爷改变主意双方洽谈

59618 ★

摘要：对我们来说，迭戈是国家极为重要的象征。

只有当 AI 生成的模型足够可打印、可装配、可使用，它才会变成下一次启动机器的理由。

1、米兰体育资本涌入，创业者扎堆，但大多数模型做的是同一件事，从海量视频里学规律，却没有学会世界怎样运转。

在西安、无锡、武汉，凡是核心客户扎堆的地方，都设了服务团队。米兰体育里奇（2300万欧元签下）和德温特（2000欧元签下）的表现勉强算是匹配了自身身价，但还没有冲击主力阵容的实力。

2、独家｜混元多模态理解负责人胡瀚离职创业，原团队或将聚焦世界模型

一个能写推理优化的实习生，可能直接顶半个初级工程师的活。

3、京东买药 × Keep 80里挑战赛来啦！跑过戈壁，才懂极限守护！

周日，梅根登上了第二趟航班，这次坐的是经济舱。

4、2年1.367亿！勇士敲定库里续约方案，一人一城生涯将延续至41岁

截至7月15日，智谱股价报1707.9港元，市值7948.19亿港元；MiniMax 市值910.11亿港元。

5、温网黑马谱写传奇，外卡球员费里五盘鏖战险胜迪米特洛夫创造历史

这意味着，FSD 正在从一项附加功能变成一个独立的需求驱动引擎。

当地时间7月10日，C罗在个人社交媒体上晒出十年前葡萄牙击败法国夺得欧洲杯冠军的照片，并配文“一场价值千金的胜利”。

不过，在内外部综合因素的影响下，CARIAD成立以后便持续亏损，且软件开发进度也不尽如人意。

6、金球奖！凯恩个人数据爆棚，亚马尔集体荣誉等身，姆巴佩均衡零冠

“因此，对于当前AI产业而言，真正需要解决的问题，已经不是如何继续堆叠更多算力，而是如何打破‘内存墙’，让已有算力得到更充分、更高效的释放。

前者承诺兜底，把质保期从8年15万公里翻倍到8年30万公里；后者则在公告里刻意回避“制造缺陷”，以“特定工况故障”定性。

7、亚马尔世界杯意外带火法兰克福街头潮牌

镰田大地是一名典型的技术型中场，能踢前腰也能踢中前卫，脚下技术细腻，传球视野开阔，有不错的组织能力和远射能力，而且跑动积极，防守端也能贡献力量。

两队历史上共交手9次，英格兰6胜1平2负占据优势，胜率超过六成。

8、当时间为记忆镀上一层金光，你会如何怀念休伊特呢？

两队历史上共有7次交手，瑞士4胜2平1负占据绝对上风。

OpenAI到底在下一部怎样的大旗？ 2024年，OpenAI植入了苹果手机。

趣丸AI音乐生态的基座是天谱乐大模型。

9、孙杨听证会证词全记录：检测人员不专业撒谎了

随后是欧美杯，以及最重要的——卡塔尔世界杯，那根扎在他心头多年的刺，终于被拔掉了。

礼来的故事，并不是行业龙头的水到渠成，而是“落魄贵族”亡羊补牢的故事。

10、1963年，贺龙要求羽毛球队出国比赛包揽金牌，陈毅：那我这个外交部长不好干了_网易订阅

有条件的家庭，父母本身在职场、有圈子，孩子从小耳濡目染"该怎么规划"；普通家庭的孩子，父母可能自己都没进过写字楼，根本给不了这类信息。

公司处于利润拐点之前，新产品已经完成，几家客户开始试用，但续约率、客单价和销售效率还没有形成足够长的记录。

1、北体大研究超级跑鞋对足部发力方式的影响，引发美国专家热议

它打开消费无人机市场的方式，是把飞行控制、稳定和校准等专业知识藏进产品里。

2、山西男篮锁定新外援，百万年薪报价27岁锋卫摇摆人，NBA场均5分1.7篮板

凯恩五场比赛打入6球并送出1次助攻，世界杯总进球数达到14粒。

3、53岁申思把小球员屁股踢肿！终身禁足还执教能把人送进申花海港

股票跌10%，仓位大致亏10%；股票跌23%，仓位大致亏23%。比失利更可怕的，是中国格斗的造神速度正如你所言，姆巴佩就是为大场面而生的球员。

4、上海交大发现：体内有恶性肿瘤的人，身体一般或可能有5个表现？

不少球迷直言：“山东泰山只输了两个已经是运气好了，全靠王大雷8次极限扑救在门前‘续命’。

5、许昕刚拿冠军，我就get了他的华住会“同款 ”

周远意识到，阶层跨越虽然不是任何投资方法可以保证的结果，但对于本金有限、收入主要来自工资的人来说，如果账户永远只有线性收益，很难达到自己的目标。

6、TA：阿森纳即将签下卡迪夫城一线队最年轻出场者东切夫

这是全球工程能力最强的团队之一，在同构环境下交出的成绩。

第三条路线是投资还没完全证明自己的年轻中锋。

同样处于待定状态的还有从亚特兰大租借回归的穆萨，阿莫林打算利用这期集训对他进行全面评估，再决定是留用还是再次外租或出售。

7、荣昌生物泰它西普两大适应症同日获批

这不仅是一场战术的博弈，更是恩怨、青春与足球哲学的极致碰撞。

德明利预计2026年上半年实现营业收入160亿元至180亿元，同比增长289%至338%；归属于上市公司股东的净利润预计为57亿元至65亿元，同比增长4932.74%-5611.02%。

8、CBA快讯！浙江官宣签约新后卫，北控签20+9大外援，多队有意前山东外援

2018年俄罗斯世界杯，格列兹曼、卢卡斯·埃尔南德斯等4名马竞球员随法国和克罗地亚闯入决赛；2022年卡塔尔世界杯，格列兹曼再度携手科雷亚、莫利纳和德保罗晋级决赛，阿根廷登顶。

贝莱德表示，强劲的经济增长和持续的盈利扩张使其继续维持“超配”美股的立场，并建议投资者重点关注电力、芯片和数据中心等AI瓶颈领域。

值得深思的是，红鸟掌控的另一支球队图卢茨也正面临管理混乱的问题，遭到球迷的集体抵制。

巴西身处C组，以2胜1平拿下小组头名，攻防两端表现均衡，3场赛事打进7球仅失1球，其中连续两场完成零封，仅首轮与摩洛哥战平丢球。

新势力6月：零跑9万登顶，蔚来小鹏抢4万，理想小米困3万三人进球破纪录却颗粒无收谁来拿2026金球奖？纳比-凯塔：我相信范戴克去米兰也能踢很好看不懂！中途砸钱从欧冠挖人，如今放弃优先续约权，CBA黑马图什么

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（文｜出海参考，作者｜王璐，编辑｜罗文琴）Nextfin News — On July 22, latest research from Omdia showed that despite total market shipments dropping by over ten percent in the second quarter, Vivo—excluding its iQOO sub-brand—maintained its top position in the Indian smartphone market with 6.3 million units shipped. Yet despite its strength in the market, Vivo was unable to keep full control over its manufacturing plants in India. There is an unwritten law in the corporate world that market share acts as a moat and scale brings bargaining power. But in India, Vivo has just seen that principle turned on its head—and in a remarkably brutal fashion. On July 9, an official approval was finally granted. Dixon Technologies announced to the stock exchange that Vivo India received a clearance letter issued on July 8 by India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Under this approval, the manufacturing operations Vivo built over twelve years in India will formally be folded into a joint venture controlled fifty-one percent by a local partner. According to industry analyses, the new entity has a paid-up capital of just fifty million rupees—around three and a half million yuan—yet it is taking over a mega-factory designed for an annual capacity of over one hundred million units and backed by a workforce of more than ten thousand employees. Viewed in isolation, this transaction reads like a story of loss. But when placed back into the context of Vivo’s global footprint, its true nature changes entirely. India remains Vivo’s largest overseas market, ranking first in 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, accounting for roughly one-third of the brand's total global volume. Overseas operations already contribute more than half of Vivo's global revenue, with targets set to raise that share to sixty percent this year and seventy percent by 2027. This shift in India does not merely affect a single regional market; it alters the structural load-bearing pillar of Vivo’s entire global strategy. With the Indian chapter coming to a close, Vivo now faces far more practical questions about its future: What exactly did this equity restructuring change, and how will the brand navigate its next phase of globalization? A Three-and-a-Half-Million Yuan Outlay for a Three-Hundred-Billion Revenue Business By securing a fifty-one percent controlling stake, Dixon leveraged its position to capture a cash cow with an annual revenue potential estimated between two hundred fifty billion and three hundred billion rupees—roughly twenty-one billion to twenty-five billion yuan. This revenue guidance originates directly from Dixon’s own management team. As early as May, Dixon founder Sunil Vachani revealed that the joint venture would handle approximately two-thirds of Vivo’s smartphone sales in India, representing over twenty million units annually. JPMorgan further projects that the joint venture will add around eleven million smartphone shipments in fiscal year 2027, scaling up to approximately twenty-two million units annually across fiscal years 2028 and 2029. From India's perspective, this outcome represents a decisive policy victory. Looking back at Vivo’s expansion abroad, its capital deployment in India consisted of substantial physical investments. According to an official press release issued by Vivo India in April 2023, the company outlined a total investment plan of seventy-five billion rupees. The first phase called for thirty-five billion rupees by the end of 2023, of which twenty-four billion had already been allocated alongside plans to inject an additional eleven billion rupees by year-end. The new facility in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, spans roughly 169 acres—a site acquired back in 2018 that officially went into operation in mid-2024. It currently holds an annual production capacity of sixty million units, with plans to double that figure to one hundred twenty million upon full completion, rivaling the footprint of Samsung’s largest manufacturing plant in the country. By 2018, Vivo's earlier facility was already generating a monthly output of around one million units while employing nearly ten thousand local workers. What do these figures truly signify? They demonstrate that Vivo was never just a consumer brand in India; it had built an end-to-end manufacturing system, a local supply chain, and a massive employment ecosystem. The company replicated its battle-tested Chinese ground-sales model across India, extending from major metropolitan shopping centers down to rural retail shops across roughly seventy thousand touchpoints. It even transformed India into an export hub, shipping Indian-made smartphones to Thailand and Saudi Arabia for the first time in 2022, with export targets exceeding one million units in 2023. Yet after 2024, every one of these capital investments transformed into a distinct disadvantage at the negotiating table. Faced with mounting regulatory pressure, Vivo initiated discussions in 2024 with major domestic players including Tata Group, Murugappa Group, and Dixon Technologies to explore joint ventures or contract manufacturing options, though early negotiations stalled. In December 2024, Vivo signed a non-binding term sheet with Dixon Technologies, initiating a protracted government approval process that dragged on for nineteen months. Upon closing, the joint venture will purchase selected manufacturing assets from Vivo for an undisclosed amount, sign dedicated production and packaging agreements with Vivo India, handle a substantial share of its OEM orders, and retain the flexibility to manufacture for third-party brands down the line. With an initial capital commitment of just 25.5 million rupees, Dixon gains access to established assembly lines, skilled workers, an integrated supply chain, and guaranteed orders from a brand selling over thirty million phones a year. In return, Vivo retains only the right to continue selling smartphones in the Indian market alongside a forty-nine percent financial yield on equity. Using a newly incorporated entity with a registered capital of merely fifty million rupees to take control of an advanced industrial plant capable of producing over one hundred million units annually is virtually unprecedented in global business history. Vivo understood the gravity of the concessions, but faced with severe regulatory constraints, it was left with few alternatives. Why Did Stronger Sales Lead to Heavier Constraints? Under standard market conditions, Vivo’s operational execution in India was textbook perfect. According to data from market research firm Omdia, Vivo—excluding iQOO—led the Indian smartphone market throughout 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, marking a nineteen percent year-over-year growth rate. Samsung trailed in second place with twenty-three million units and a fifteen percent share. By the fourth quarter, Vivo widened its lead even further, shipping 7.9 million units in a single quarter to capture twenty-three percent of the market. Securing the top spot in the world's second-largest smartphone market—a region absorbing roughly one hundred fifty-four million devices annually—should have been a landmark corporate victory after twelve years of dedicated effort. However, as policy priorities shifted unexpectedly, the very capital-heavy assets Vivo spent years building transformed into immobilized leverage against the company. In April 2020, India enacted Press Note 3, requiring case-by-case government review for all direct foreign investments originating from countries sharing a land border. This rule effectively blocked capital injection channels for Chinese entities. Over the following years, regulatory scrutiny targeting Chinese smartphone manufacturers steadily intensified. In July 2022, authorities accused Vivo India of illicitly remitting 624.76 billion rupees back to China under the guise of tax avoidance. Vivo was hardly the only brand reshaped by this changing regulatory framework. Enforcement agencies froze 55.51 billion rupees of Xiaomi India’s assets in a dispute that remains unresolved; OPPO received a customs tax demand totaling 43.89 billion rupees; Transsion's manufacturing subsidiary, Ismartu India, surrendered a 50.1 percent controlling stake to Dixon; and HKC’s joint venture with Dixon was approved under a seventy-four to twenty-six equity structure. Faced with these conditions, Vivo was forced into a harsh binary choice: abandon its sunk costs and hand over billions of rupees in physical plants and distribution networks, or accept majority control by a local partner in exchange for permission to remain in the market. The restructuring struck directly at the primary engine of Vivo’s international business. India is not just another regional market for Vivo; it is its largest overseas pillar. In March of last year during the Boao Forum for Asia, Vivo COO Hu Baishan emphasized two key realities to Bloomberg: India is Vivo's most critical international market, and with overseas sales contributing over half of total revenues, the company is aiming for sixty percent in 2026 and seventy percent by 2027. In essence, the restructuring in India does not just adjust a local subsidiary; it alters the foundational premise of Vivo’s global expansion story. The "deep localization" playbook—building local plants, hiring local workforces, and cultivating local component ecosystems—long viewed as an ideal blueprint for overseas expansion, saw its ownership structure unilaterally rewritten in its most prominent market. Without Direct Plant Ownership in India, How Will Vivo Secure One-Third of Its Global Footprint? From a strategic standpoint, Vivo officially characterizes its international methodology as "More Local, More Global." The strategy relies on manufacturing localization through plants in markets like India and Brazil; marketing localization via major cultural partnerships ranging from the Indian Premier League to official sponsorships at the UEFA European Championship; and channel localization by exporting its field-sales distribution networks. The effectiveness of this approach is undeniable, as evidenced by Vivo holding the top market position in both India and Indonesia. Yet Vivo’s challenges in India expose the inherent vulnerabilities of this model: an over-concentration in specific regional markets and the property-rights risk associated with capital-heavy physical infrastructure. Pushing "More Local" to its logical extreme means anchoring factories, workforces, and supply chain assets entirely within foreign legal jurisdictions. Under favorable conditions, these assets form competitive barriers; during regulatory shifts, they turn into operational exposure. The deeper Vivo planted its roots in India over twelve years, the less leverage it retained during structural negotiations. Another challenge lies in Vivo's limited footprint across premium segments and developed Western markets. In discussions with Bloomberg, Hu Baishan noted that Vivo has paused expansion into developed regions like the United States and Western Europe, where carrier channels and Apple hold dominant positions, preferring instead to consider entering via new product categories over a three-to-five-year horizon. In India, the focus shifts toward expanding presence in the premium segment above six hundred dollars. In short, Vivo’s international expansion remains focused primarily on mid-to-entry segments across emerging markets, offering thinner profit margins. A six percent decline in Southeast Asian regional shipments in 2025 serves as a clear reminder of these market dynamics. So where does the company go from here? Part of the answer is already visible in Vivo’s recent strategic adjustments. First, Vivo is reframing its presence in India, shifting from a direct asset-owning manufacturer to a brand, technology, and distribution coordinator. This setup preserves market share, protects cash flow, maintains a forty-nine percent financial yield, and allows its premium product plans to proceed as intended. This structural pivot is not mere external speculation; it is explicitly defined by the mechanics of the joint venture agreement. According to regulatory filings submitted by Dixon, the joint venture is mandated to carry out three specific operational functions: acquire selected manufacturing assets from Vivo, execute contract manufacturing and packaging agreements with Vivo India, and fulfill OEM orders—initially covering roughly two-thirds of Vivo’s local sales volume before opening up capacity to third-party brands. In other words, the joint venture functions as a contract manufacturer, while product R&D, branding, pricing strategy, and retail distribution remain controlled by Vivo India. Holding a forty-nine percent equity stake, Vivo transitions to an equity accounting model rather than full revenue consolidation while retaining proportional board representation to safeguard its governance voice. Simply put: manufacturing operations transfer to a locally controlled partner, while the commercial brand and retail business remain firmly in Vivo's hands. Maintaining market leadership, preserving operational cash flow, and collecting a forty-nine percent share of manufacturing profits represents a practical compromise designed to minimize disruption. Second, Vivo is actively establishing a multi-hub manufacturing and brand strategy. In late May 2025, Vivo launched its product line in São Paulo, Brazil, under the Jovi sub-brand name. Because the "Vivo" trademark was already registered by local telecom operator Telefônica, the company adapted by entering under an alternate brand identity. Manufacturing was assigned to a local partner, GBR, with production lines established in the Manaus Free Trade Zone that went operational in January 2025. Complemented by established market positions in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, Latin America is emerging as Vivo's next core strategic region. The Brazilian operating model serves as a template tailored for the post-India era: brand names can adapt, manufacturing can be outsourced to regional assembly partners, and market entry moves forward without exposing heavy physical assets to single-jurisdiction legal risk. The experience in India delivers a clear lesson on corporate asset ownership: deep operational localization alone is no longer an absolute defense, making governance structure and geographic diversification essential indicators of long-term resilience.7月24日，旭阳新材IPO即将上会。

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